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NOTES 
The Self-critical Analysis Privilege and Discovery of 
Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits 
Executive Order 11,2461 requires that nonexempt government con-
tractors2 agree to nondiscrimination and affirmative action program 
provisions in contracts with governmental agencies. 3 A large propor-
tion of American employers must prepare affirmative action plans 
under this order.4 These plans must include statistical analyses of the 
sexual, racial and ethnic composition of the employer's work force and 
of the availability of women and minorities to fill particular jobs, 5 an 
1. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e app. at 19-24 
(1981). A history of nondiscrimination clauses in preceding executive orders is detailed in Con-
tractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 168-71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 
(1971). 
2. The Department of Labor has exempted contracts and subcontracts not exceeding 
$10,000, except government bills of lading and contracts with financial institutions which are 
depositories for federal funds or issue savings bonds or notes. If a contractor has contracts or 
subcontracts within a 12-month period with an aggregate value exceeding $10,000, the exemp-
tion does not apply. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(l) (1984). 
3. Contractors and subcontractors must agree not to "discriminate against any employee or 
applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin" and to "take 
affirmative action" to ensure that applicants and employees are treated "without regard" to such 
factors. Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), reprinted as amended 
in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e app. at 19-24 (1981). Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1967), added 
the word "sex" and substituted "religion" for "creed." 
4. All nonconstruction contractors with 50 or more employees and a government contract of 
$50,000 or more must institute a formal, written affirmative action plan for each of its establish-
ments. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40(a), -2.l(a) (1984). According to an early estimate, one-third of the 
labor force was covered by the Executive Order in 1966. Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-
discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 591-92 (1969). A 
later estimate placed the coverage at 40% of the workforce. V. PERLO, EcoNOMICS OF RACISM 
USA 225 (1976), quoted in U.S. CoMMN. ON Civ. RTS., PROMISES AND PERCEPTIONS: FED-
ERAL EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION 5 (1981). In 1972 more than 50% of firms employing more than 100 people were covered 
under the Executive Order. Goldstein & Smith, The Estimated Impact of the Antidiscrimination 
Program Aimed at Federal Contractors, 29 INDus. LAB. REL. REv. 523, 524 (1976). 
5. The plan must contain a statistical analysis of the employer's work force, 41 C.F.R. § 60-
2.ll(a) (1984), and of the availability of minorities and women available for employment in job 
groups (consisting of jobs with similar content) wage rates and opportunity for advancement, 41 
C.F.R. § 60-2.ll(b) (1984). Extensive information must be gathered and considered in deterinin-
ing availability. Section 60-2.ll(b)(l) provides: 
In determining whether minorities are being underutilized in any job gro.up, the contrac-
tor will consider at least all of the following factors: 
(i) The minority population of the labor area surrounding the facility;. 
(ii) The size of the minority unemployment force in the labor area surrounding the facil-
ity; 
(iii) The percentage of the minority work force as compared with the total work force in 
the immediate area; · 
(iv) The general availability of minorities having requisite skills in the immediate labor 
area; 
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analysis of the employer's utilization of the available workers, 6 goals 
to correct deficiencies, 7 and a self-critical discussion of the employer's 
problem areas. s 
Plaintiffs bringing federal employment discrimination suits under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 are often interested in either 
the statistics or the self-analysis of company policy contained in af-
firmative action plans and frequently attempt to obtain them from a 
defendant employer during discovery. 10 These discovery requests cre-
ate a conflict between the plaintiff's interest in obtaining the informa-
(v) The availability of minorities having requisite skills in an area in which the contrac-
tor can reasonably recruit; 
(vi) The availability of promotable and transferable minorities within the contractor's 
organization; 
(vii) The existence of training institutions capable of training persons in the requisite 
skills; and 
(viii) The degree of training which the contractor is reasonably able to undertake as a 
means of making all job classes available to minorities. 
The factors for determining availability of women are similar. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b){2) (1984). 
6. Work force levels and availability must be compared to determine where minorities and 
women are "underutilized." " 'Underutilization' is defined as having fewer minorities or women 
in a particular job group than would reasonably be expected by their availability." 41 C.F.R. 
§ 60-2.ll(b) (1984). At present, the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compli· 
ance Programs (OFCCP) defines a deficiency as any difference between availability and utiliza-
tion. OFCCP Federal Contract Compliance Manual§§ 2-160.la, 2-180.2 (1979). 
In regulations proposed August 2S, 1981, the OFCCP proposed to redefine underutilization 
so that an establishment would be presumed to have reasonably utilized women and minorities if 
utilization were at 80% of availability. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,994 (1981) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. 
§ 60-2.1 l(b). As of July 1, 1984, no action had been taken on the proposed changes. 41 C.F.R. 
Appendix- Postponed Regulations: Chapter 60-0ffice of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs 
(1984). 
7. "An acceptable affirmative action program must include ••• goals and timetables to 
which the contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies and, thus to 
achieve prompt and full utilization of minorities and women at all levels and in all segments of its 
work force where deficiencies exist." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1984). These goals should not be 
"inflexible quotas" but "targets reasonably attainable by means of applying every good faith 
effort." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) (1984). 
8. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.10, -2.13(d) (1984). 
9. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1982). 
10. Plaintiffs may alternatively obtain the plans through the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (1982), from OFCCP, which administers the Executive Order. This 
process is often difficult and time consuming. See Fleming, The Freedom of Information Act: An 
Important Discovery Aid in Labor Law Cases, 16 LAW NOTES FOR THE GEN. PRACTITIONER S3, 
S4 (1980); Note, A Balanced Approach to Affirmative Action Discovery in Title VII Suits, 32 HAs-
TINGS LJ. 1013, 1021 (1981). 
Employers may respond to a FOIA request for an affirmative action plan with a "reverse 
FOIA" suit to block release, claiming that the agency abused its discretion by failing to catego-
rize the plan under one ofFOIA's nine exemptions. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 
317-18 (1979); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976);see also CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) 1f 32,402 (D.D.C. 1981) (allowing the release of affirmative action plans using Chrysler 
criteria). 
The FOIA is also less attractive to Title VII plaintiffs because there is no requirement that the 
plans be filed with OFCCP, although the contractor must produce them on request from 
OFCCP, such as during a compliance review. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a)(3), -1.40(c), -2.12{m), (n) 
(1984). Data files maintained by a government grantee are not "agency records" and therefore 
not within the scope of FOIA, even though the government has a right of access to the data. 
Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980). Therefore, plans that have never been submitted to 
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tion and the employer's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of 
the plans. Courts have differed widely in their approach to this con-
flict and have split on the question of whether plans should be 
discoverable. 11 
This Note argues that plaintiffs should have access to affirmative 
action plans in discovery. Part I describes the "self-critical analysis" 
or "self-evaluative" privilege that employers have advanced to block 
discovery of such plans. Part II examines the conflicting interests of 
society, employers and employees in allowing or denying discovery. 
Part III evaluates the application of a self-critical analysis privilege in 
light of these conflicting interests and concludes that the privilege 
should not be applied to affirmative action plans. 
I. THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
Affirmative action plans play an important role in both of the ma-
jor federal programs aimed at eliminating employment discrimination. 
The plans are a cornerstone of the Executive Order program, which 
uses the government's contracting power to set standards for employ-
ers.12 In addition, the plans aid the enforcement of Title VII's statu-
tory prohibition against employment discrimination based on "race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin."13 Private suits by employees 
are one of the many administrative and judicial enforcement mecha-
nisms that Title VII provides, 14 and employers have frequently faced 
extensive discovery requests for affirmative action materials in such 
suits. Although employers have occasionally invoked the work prod-
uct doctrine,15 employee privacy,16 trade secrets,17 the attorney-client 
OFCCP probably cannot be disclosed under FOIA. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 930-31 n.221 (2d ed. 1983). 
A second alternative to discovery is obtaining the plans from the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC). Title VII plaintiffs who file grievances with the EEOC may obtain 
the information contained in EEOC investigatory files. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 
449 U.S. 590 (1981). However, the investigatory fiJes rarely contain affirmative action plans, 
although disclosure of the plans between agencies has been upheld. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schles-
inger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 
1977), cerL denied, 433 U.S. 995 (1978). 
11. See notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text. 
12. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text. 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). 
14. A person claiming to be a victim of discrimination must file a charge with the EEOC. 
The EEOC investigates the charge, and will dismiss it if it finds no reasonable cause to believe the 
charge is true. If reasonable cause is found, the EEOC must try to eliminate the discriminatory 
practice by "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b) 0976). If these informal methods fail, the EEOC may bring a civil action against the em-
ployer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). An employee may request a right-to-sue letter, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.28(a)(l) (1984), and then file a private action if the EEOC either dismisses the charge or 
does not file suit within 180 days after the charge was filed with it. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). 
15. The work product doctrine protects information "prepared in anticipation oflitigation or 
for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The term was initially articulated in Hickman v. Taylor, 
153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945), ajfd., 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Affirmative action plans or related 
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privilege18 and the physician-patient privilege19 to limit discovery in 
employment discrimination cases, none of these concepts are generally 
appropriate for protection of affirmative action plans, and employers 
have increasingly relied on a self-critical analysis privilege to resist dis-
covery of these plans. 20 
The self-critical analysis privilege was originally invoked to protect 
a hospital committee's investigatory report in Bredice v. Doctors Hospi-
tal, 21 a medical malpractice case.22 The court denied discovery on the 
material have occasionally been protected as work product. E.g., Jacobs v. Sea-Land Serv., 23 
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1l 30,907 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (formal responses to EEOC charges pro-
tected); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 12 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 100 (W.D. Pa. 
1975) (plan protected; ''To hold that validation studies prepared after the passage of Title VII 
were not prepared in anticipation of litigation •.. would be to strain the limits of credulity."); 
Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 117, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1971) 
(internal report used to prepare affirmative action plan could be work product where preparation 
team included an attorney and report contained his " 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
or legal theories' "). Affirmative action plans required under the Executive Order would not 
normally pass the test for work product since they are prepared in the normal course of business 
and not in anticipation of litigation. See 8 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2024 (1970). 
16. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (upholding employer's re-
fusal to turn over aptitude test scores to union on grounds of employee privacy); Baer v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (defendant not required to 
provide information on religious affiliation of employees); cf. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 28 
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1l 32,402, at 23,735 (D.D.C. 1981) (FOIA disclosure of affirmative 
action plan; salary information withheld for employee privacy). But see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. 
General Servs. Admin., 402 F. Supp. 378, 384-85 (D.D.C. 1975) (FOIA disclosure of plan up-
held; rejected privacy reasons for withholding comments), remanded, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977). 
17. See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272, 279 (D. Conn. 
1980) (defendant may eliminate critical self-evaluations from affirmative action plan before dis-
covery, not to advance policy of encouraging effective self-criticism, but to avoid adverse business 
impact); cf. Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 501 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Va. 1980) (disclosure of affirma-
tive action plan under FOIA would expose confidential business information, violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1905 and resulting in economic damage), vacated and remanded sub nom. General Motors 
Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981). 
18. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Sea-Land Serv., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1f 30,907, at 15,696 
(N.D. Cal. 1980) 
19. See, e.g., Davis v. Street Pavers, Local 440, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1{ 10,116 (W. D. 
Wash. 1975). 
20. The broad discovery of materials "not privileged" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(l), see note 87 infra, refers both to privilege as it is understood in the rules of evidence and 
to the work product doctrine. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); see also C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS § 81 (4th ed. 1983). However, the self-critical analysis privilege has 
been asserted only during discovery and could be regarded as a discovery privilege analogous to 
the work product doctrine rather than as an evidentiary privilege. See Flanagan, Rejecting a 
General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 551, 575, 577 (1983). 
21. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd., 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
22. Hospital medical review proceedings are protected by statute in several states, see, e.g., 
Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1976), but courts have disagreed on whether to 
apply a common law privilege. Compare Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971); Dade County Medical Assn. v. Holis, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Oviatt v. 
Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 191 Neb. 224, 226-27, 214 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1974) (recogniz-
ing a privilege), with Davidson v. Light, 79 F.R.D. 137, 139-40 (D. Colo. 1978); Shibilski v. St. 
Joseph's Hosp., 83 Wis. 2d 459, 467, 266 N.W.2d 264, 268 (1978) (refusing to recognize a privi-
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ground that release of such reports would end candor and criticism in 
staff deliberations, which the court found necessary to continued im-
provements in patient care. 23 This general public policy favoring con-
fidentiality for self-criticism has been expanded and applied, although 
by no means uniformly, to protect documents in other contexts, in-
cluding police department investigations24 and academic peer re-
views. 25 Corporations have asserted, so far unsuccessfully, a similar 
privilege to protect internal reports of corporate investigations.26 
The first court to recognize a self-critical analysis privilege in a 
Title VII case applied it to internal reports used in preparation of an 
affirmative action plan rather than to the plan itself. 27 The court relied 
on an analogy to Bredice and concluded that discovery of the reports 
would "discourage frank self-criticism and evaluation in the develop-
ment of affirmative action programs."28 
The courts have since extended this privilege from background re-
ports to the finalized plans required by Executive Order 11,246, rea-
soning that the privilege 
stems from the public policy which recognizes that voluntary compli-
lege). See generally Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, 1 
AM. J. L. & MEo. 245 (1975). 
23. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250-51. 
24. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1970); Kott v. Perini, 283 F. 
Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1968). Police reports may also be protected from discovery under the execu-
tive privilege. See, e.g., Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 342-44 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Wood 
v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 11 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
25. See, e.g., McKillop v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1975) 
(denying discovery of confidential peer reviews); EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 
331 (7th Cir. 1983) (files discoverable by EEOC but reviewers' identities concealed). But see 
Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 908 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring disclosure); In re 
Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Lynn v. 
Regents of the Univ. ofCal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring disclosure when the 
university's defense is based on the contents of the files), cert denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982); Jepsen 
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne 
College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.) (same, in dictum), cert denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Zaus-
tinsky v. University of Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (requiring disclosure if plaintiff 
can demonstrate a prima facie case). See generally Lee, Balancing Confidentiality and Disclosure 
in Faculty Peer Review: Impact of Title VII Litigation, 9 J. CoLL. & U.L. 279 (1983); Note, 
Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Proposed Academic Freedom Privi-
lege, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1538 (1981). 
26. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Resnick v. Ameri-
can Dental Assn., 95 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 
F.R.D. 518, 520-22 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). Several co=entators have advocated extending the 
privilege to corporate self-evaluations. See Crisman & Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging 
Corporate ''Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123 (1983); Murphy, The Self-
Evaluative Privilege, 7 J. CoRP. L. 489 (1982); Case Co=ent, The Attorney-Client Privilege, the 
Self-Evaluative Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 699, 722-
25 (1979). 
27. Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 117 (N.D. Ga. li)71). 
28. Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 117, 118 (N.D. Ga. 
1971). 
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ance by employers . . is essential for implementation of the policy of 
equal opportunity in employment. . . . If subjective materials constitut-
ing "self-critical analysis" are subject to disclosure during discovery, this 
disclosure would tend to have a "chilling effect" on an employer's volun-
tary compliance. 29 
Courts have divided on the issue of whether affirmative action 
plans should be discoverable. Despite the general breadth of modern 
discovery30 and its particularly liberal application in Title VII suits,31 
some courts have recognized the self-critical analysis privilege and 
have denied discovery of plans entirely.32 Others have allowed com-
plete discovery33 or allowed discovery of factual portions of plans. 34 
29. Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
30. See notes 87-88 infra and accompanying text. 
31. See notes 89-95 infra and accompanying text. 
32. E.g., Stevenson v. General Elec. Co., No. 80-3644, slip. op. (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 1982) 
(available on LEXIS, Labor library, Courts file), af]k. 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 746 (S.D. 
Ohio 1978); Jamison v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1296 (E.D. Mich. 1981); 
McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 
19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 9076 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 11 Empt. 
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 10, 659 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 12 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 100 (W.D. Pa. 1975); cf. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 20 Fair Empt. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 526, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (denying discovery of evaluative reports prepared in course 
of preparing affirmative action plan). 
33. E.g., Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446, 451-54 (D. Md. 1984); Zahorik v. 
Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27, 32-33 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); EEOC v. Burlington Northern, Inc., No. 
78C-269, slip. op. (N.D. ID. Dec. 10, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Labor library, Courts file); 
Riggs v. United Parcel Serv., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 93 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Ford v. 
University of Notre Dame, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 31,203 (N.D. Ind. 1980); Jacobs v. 
Sea-Land Serv., 23 Empt. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 30,907 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Ligon v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 722 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Empt. 
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 8969 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Ylla v. Delta Airlines, 18 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 
ff 6937 (N.D. Ga. 1977); EEOC v. ISC Fin. Corp., 16 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 174, 179 
(W.D. Mo. 1977); EEOC v. Quick Shop Mkts., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 133, 135-36 (E.D. Mo. 1975), 
affd., 526 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1975); cf. In re Burlington Northern Inc., 679 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 
1982) (denying application for writ of mandamus to vacate discovery order for self-critical inf or· 
mation regarding affirmative action program); Thompson v. Sun Oil Co., 523 F.2d 647 (8th Cii. 
1975) (costs assessed against defendant for "inexcusable" behavior preventing discovery of plan); 
Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 511 (D. Or. 1983) (affirmative action 
documents, except those defendant is required by law to file, not privileged); Hudson v. Interna-
tional Business Mach. Sys. Dev. Div., 22 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
("candid self-analysis" relating to race not privileged); Johnson v. W.H. Stewart Co., 75 F.R.D. 
541 (W.D. Oki. 1976) (interrogatories on affirmative action program allowed). When the public 
policy arguments underlying the self-critical analysis privilege have been raised as a reason to 
deny release of affirmative action plans in reverse-FOIA suits, the plans have been released. See 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Kreps, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 30,904 (D. Md., 1980); Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974), vacated and remanded, 20 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1422 (9th Cir. 1979). 
34. E.g., Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, No. 83 Cir. 3716 (WCC), slip. op. 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Nash v. City of Oak· 
wood, 90 F.R.D. 633, 637 (S.D. Ohio 1981), dismissed, 541 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. Ohio 1982); 
National Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn. 1980); Roberts v. 
National Detroit Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1980); O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 
211 (D. Mass. 1980); Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626 (S.D.N.Y.1979); Parker v. 
Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 8995 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Dickerson v. United States 
Steel Corp., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ff 11,095 (E.D. Pa. 1976); cf. Penk v. Oregon State Bd. 
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The techniques courts have used have varied as widely as their results. 
Some have approved or disapproved a blanket privilege for all affirma-
tive action plans. 35 Other courts have balanced the conflicting inter-
ests of the plaintiff and defendant in the individual case, often 
subjecting the disputed material to in camera inspection. 36 Still others 
have summarily held plans discoverable without discussing a self-criti-
cal analysis privilege at all. 31 
II. CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN THE DISCOVERY OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS 
The decision to grant or deny discovery of affirmative action plans 
implicates conflicting interests between the plaintiff and defendant in a 
particular Title VII suit and between the different approaches adopted 
by the Executive Order and Title VII to eliminate employment dis-
crimination. This Part first examines the interests that support the use 
of the self-critical analysis privilege to prevent discovery of affirmative 
action plans. It then discusses the strong countervailing interests that 
are advanced by allowing discovery, concluding that those latter inter-
ests weigh against the recognition of a privilege. 
A. Interests That Weigh Against Permitting the Discovery of 
Affirmative Action Plans 
1. Effectiveness of Affirmative Action Plans 
Society has a great interest in effective affirmative action plans. 
They constitute a major mechanism for meeting the goal of Executive 
Order 11,246: "the promotion and insuring of equal opportunity for 
all persons, without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin, employed or seeking employment with Government contrac-
tors .... "38 While the Executive Order has no statutory basis, and 
its effect has been controversial, 39 it has the force of law40 and has 
of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 506 (D. Or. 1982) (employer must release nonself-evaluative portions 
of affirmative action compliance reports); IUE v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (no dis-
closure of affirmative action plan to union, but employer must provide statistical work force 
analysis); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 117 (N.D. Ga. 1971) 
(internal report used to prepare affirmative action plan privileged from discovery, but must pro-
vide factual and statistical information). 
35. Compare EEOC v. Burlington Northern, Inc., No. 78C269, slip op. (N.D. ill. Dec. 10, 
1982) (available on LEXIS, Labor library, Courts file) (refusing to recognize privilege, allowing 
discovery), with Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (recognizing 
privilege, self-evaluation not discoverable). 
36. See cases cited at note 132 infra. 
37. See, e.g., Riggs v. United Parcel Serv., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 93 (E.D. Mo. 
1980); Ford v. University of Notre Dame, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1f 31,203 (N.D. Ind. 
1980); Jacobs v. Sea-Land Serv., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1f 30,907 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
38. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.1 (1984). 
39. The Executive Order has been lauded as one of the most effective of all federal efforts to 
produce equal employment opportunity. See Note, A Proposal for Reconciling Affirmative Action 
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received support from Congress41 and from civil rights groups.42 
Employers argue that confidentiality is needed to encourage volun-
tary compliance with the Executive Order. This emphasis on volun-
tary compliance is based on the common-sense idea that self-criticism 
is always more valuable when done voluntarily than when done out-of 
obligation. Government contractors may produce plans under a 
threat of sanctions which satisfy the letter of the regulations, but steps 
toward meeting nondiscrimination goals are more likely to be effective 
when employers are not worried about disclosure of unmet, more am-
bitious objectives.43 Employers argue that confidentiality is necessary 
for a "good faith" effort44 in drawing up plans because otherwise plans 
with Nondiscrimination Under the Contractor Antidiscrimination Program, 30 STAN. L. REV. 803 
(1978). At the same time, enforcement of the order has been criticized as inadequate. See Gallo· 
way, Administrative and Judicial Nullification of Federal Affirmative Action Law, 11 SANTA 
Cl.ARA L. REv. 559, 564-72 (1977). Studies in the early 1970's indicated a small increase in 
black male employment for governmental contractors as compared to noncontractors, but no 
gain for women or other minorities and no gain in occupational position. Heckman & Wolpin, 
Does the Contract Compliance Program Work? An Analysis of Chicago Data, 29 INDUS. & LAD. 
REL. REV. 544, 555-58 (1976); Goldstein & Smith, The Estimated Impact of the Antidiscrimina· 
tion Program Aimed at Federal Contractors, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 523, 534 (1976). The 
emphasis before the revision of the compliance regulations in 1971 was on eliminating racial, not 
sexual discrimination, which may explain the poor results for women. Goldstein & Smith, supra, 
at 536. Doubts have been expressed that with competitive bidding for contracts, there are no 
profits (economic rents) to provide incentives for a real change in minority employment. See, 
e.g., Cain, Comment, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 572, 573 (1976). However, case studies 
suggest that large, profitable contracts facilitate affirmative action, especially in industries with a 
longstanding investment in specialized activities involving government contracts. Cost overruns, 
sole source bids and hope of future contracts also modify the competitive nature of the process. 
Id. at 573. 
Even with proper incentives, affirmative action is difficult to apply in a recession. The con· 
cept of affirmative action was developed at a time when the work force was expanding, and hiring 
goals can have little effect during a period of layoffs. As the most recent hirees, the beneficiaries 
of affirmative action have often been the first workers laid off and the last recalled. See Firefight· 
ers Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (Title VII bars modification of a 
consent plan providing affirmative hiring and promotion to protect minorities from layoffs under 
a bona fide seniority system). 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 282 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. La. 
1968), affd., 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1970). 
41. Congress rejected crippling modifications to the Executive Order program in considering 
the 1972 amendments to Title VII. See Jones, Twenty-one Years of Affirmative Action: The 
Maturation of the Administrative Enforcement Process under the Executive Order 11,246 as 
amended, 59 CHI-KENT L. REv. 67, 117-18 (1982). It gave positive statutory status to affirma· 
tive action obligations in§ 718 of the amended act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as 
amended Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 13, 86 Stat. 113 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-17 (1982)). Congress has also provided for affirmative action for additional classes of 
employees in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112 §§ 501-04, 87 Stat. 390.94 
(1973), and the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-508, §§ 402, 403(a), 88 Stat. 
1593 (1974) (currently codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 2012 & 2014 (1982)). 
42. In late 1976 the Department of Labor proposed revised rules which would have substan· 
tially modified the requirements for affirmative action programs. Civil rights groups opposed the 
changes and they were not enacted. See Galloway, supra note 39, at 560 n.11. 
43. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 565. 
44. See note 7 supra. 
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will be written conservatively with one eye on potential disclosure.45 
While confidentiality might enhance the quality of self-criticism, 
confidentiality alone cannot ensure that a plan will be effective in 
meeting Executive Order goals. Disincentives more powerful than the 
prospect of discovery often discourage employers from preparing an 
aggressive affirmative action plan. Affirmative action programs repre-
sent an effort to advance government goals by incorporating those 
goals into organizational planning. To the extent that the government 
goal of eradicating employment discrimination requires changes in an 
employer's existing procedures, there is bound to be pressure to pre-
pare a conservative plan.46 Also, in a typical institution, the responsi-
bility for preparing affirmative action plans lies with a personnel 
department that may have little influence on management decisions.47 
There are usually few institutional rewards for achievement in the area 
of affirmative action and few sanctions for lack of achievement. 48 Af-
firmative action officers are typically caught between conflicting loyal-
ties to minority and women employees whose interests they are 
attempting to advance, and to the managers of the organization who 
may not share a commitment to affirmative action.49 Confidentiality 
may increase the quality of plans in spite of such powerful disincen-
tives, but it is misleading to concentrate entirely on the importance of 
confidentiality to the exclusion of all the other factors that determine 
the effectiveness of affirmative action programs. Since confidentiality 
by itself is not sufficient to bring about rigorous self-criticism, it should 
not be sufficient to deny access to plans in the face of strong counter-
vailing interests. 
Another reason for stressing voluntarism in the preparation of af-
45. See notes 135-36 infra and accompanying text. 
46. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 564. 
47. See 2 U.S. CoMMN. ON ClvIL RIGHTS, CoNSULTATIONS ON THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
STATEMENT OF THE U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 105 (1982) (statement of George 
Neely) [hereinafter cited as CoNSULTATIONS]. 
48. Id. 
49. See CoNSULTATIONS, supra note 47, at 107 (statement of Mark Chesler). Commissioner 
Ruckelshaus has characterized the effects of such conflicting loyalties on affirmative action 
programs: 
My experience with those in corporations who have responsibility for affirmative action 
programs is that they are pretty much trying to keep their heads down; they are trying very 
hard to have a plan that will keep their company out of court, unembarrassed, and not 
blotch their own career path, but anything that might jeopardize that is considered pretty 
high-risk stuff. 
Id. at 94. 
Even with full support from management, there are limits to what can be achieved with ¢e 
analysis mandated for affirmative action plans. Utilization analysis compares the proportion of 
minority and women members in a job group to the proportion in the available labor pool, see 
notes 5-6 supra, but this "industrial model" does not work well for highly skilled jobs where 
qualifications are difficult to quantify and the availability of qualified individuals is hard to docu-
ment. See Note, supra note 39, at 807 n.20. In addition, the wrong assumption as to the labor 
pool from which employees will be drawn can completely alter the result of the calculations. See, 
e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
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firmative action plans is the impossibility of policing all government 
contractors for compliance. The Office of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programs (OFCCP), which administers the Executive Order, has 
powerful sanctions at its disposal,50 but enforcement has been limited 
by lack of staff51 and, before 1978, by a policy of decentralization in 
which each individual contracting government agency was responsible 
for contract compliance. 52 OFCCP has concentrated its enforcement 
efforts on compliance reviews53 in certain target industries and on pre-
award audits of major prospective contractors, and has brought few 
enforcement proceedings. 54 In one observer's view, the "rapid devel-
opment in law and regulation outpaced the mechanisms that enforce 
them."55 
But the public is not entirely dependent on voluntary compliance 
to fulfill the requirements of the Executive Order program; existing 
enforcement power provides some incentive to comply. If OFCCP en-
forcement proves inadequate, one possibility for improvement would 
be to consolidate OFCCP functions with those of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which administers Title 
VII. 56 Commentators have also argued that enforcement could be im-
proved by allowing private suits, either under a private right of action 
added to the Executive Order or on a third-party beneficiary theory,57 
In short, existing enforcement problems do not warrant dependence 
on confidentiality as a way to produce voluntary compliance. Indeed, 
50. Sanctions that may be imposed for noncompliance include cancellation, tennination or 
suspension of a contract, and "debarment" from future contracts with any governmental agency. 
Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 209(a)(5), (a)(6), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), reprinted as amended 
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 19-24 (1981). For an illustration of the Secretary's broad power to 
invoke debarment, see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979) (upholding 
debarment as an appropriate administrative sanction for failure to comply with OFCCP pre-
hearing discovery regulations). OFCCP may also recommend judicial enforcement proceedings 
pursuant to the Executive Order or Title VII. Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 209(a)(2), (a)(3). 
51. See Jones, supra note 41, at 79. 
52. See Galloway, supra note 39, at 562-63, 570. Contract compliance functions relating to 
equal opportunity were transferred to the Department of Labor by Exec. Order No. 12806, 43 
Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978). 
53. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.20 (1984). The reviews may involve an analysis of the contractor's 
employment practices, the adequacy of its affirmative action program and its compliance with 
the program. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.20(a) (1984). Violations may include submission of an inade-
quate affirmative action plan or failure to submit a plan. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(l) (1984). When 
deficiencies or violations are found, the agency must try to encourage compliance through concil-
iation and persuasion. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.20(b) (1984). When these procedures fail, administra-
tive proceedings normally follow. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(2) (1984). 
54. Compliance agencies issued show cause notices in only 1.2% of compliance reviews be-
tween July 1971 and March 1974. G.A.O., THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM 
FOR FEDERAL NONCONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS CAN BE IMPROVED 27 (1975). 
55. CoNSULTATIONS, supra note 47, at 72 (statement of Eleanor Holmes-Norton). 
56. See CoNSULTATIONS, supra note 47, at 74 (statement of Eleanor Holmes-Norton); Jones, 
supra note 41, at 120-22. 
57. Galloway, supra note 39, at 572-93; Jones, supra note 41, at 112-17. Courts have thus far 
refused to recognize a private right of action under Executive Order No. 11,246. 
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it is possible that the prospect of discovery - while it might thwart 
complete candor in the preparation of affirmative action plans - actu-
ally encourages otherwise uncooperative employers to put together a 
plan in a manner that is at least facially adequate. 
2. Fairness 
Employers who regard preparation of rigorous affirmative action 
plans as advancing their own interests will continue to do so even 
under a threat of disclosure. However, courts have suggested that a 
second reason for granting a self-critical analysis privilege to affirma-
tive action plans is to "assure fairness to persons who have been re-
quired by law to engage in self-evaluation."58 
Some commentators have assumed that the adverse effects of plan 
disclosure would fall most heavily on employers with the greatest 
commitment to affirmative action because they will set high goals that 
may be difficult to achieve. 59 However, an employer's current good 
faith efforts in drawing up a plan should not be used to deny relief to 
individuals who have been the victims of past discrimination. More 
importantly, it is likely that the burdens of disclosure will fall most 
heavily on those employers who have a poor employment record for 
minorities and women. 
Employers have argued that information in affirmative action 
plans may hurt their competitive position by revealing their efficient 
use of labor, putting them at a disadvantage in competitive bidding, 
facilitating undesirable technology transfer and enabling employee 
raiding. In addition, revelations of anticipated layoffs and applicant 
flow data may damage employee morale and discourage qualified mi-
nority and female applicants. 60 Another concern is that the plaintiff 
may be engaged in a fishing expedition for charges and the discussion 
58. O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980). Materials protected 
have generally been those prepared for mandatocy government reports. Webb. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 81F.R.D.431, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Compare Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher 
Educ., 99 F.R.D. 506 (D. Or. 1982) (privilege recognized for self-evaluative portions of required 
affirmative action reports), with Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 511 (D. 
Or. 1983) (no privilege for documents unless filing is required by law). Courts have, however, 
recognized the self-critical analysis privilege outside the Title VII context despite the fact that the 
party preparing the report was under no obligation to do so. See notes 21, 24-25 supra and 
accompanying text. Indeed, one might argue that the privilege ought to extend only to materials 
prepared for non-mandatocy reports. See note 70 infra and accompanying text. 
59. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 20, at 566. While an employer does have flexibility in 
setting goals and timetables consistent with a "good faith effort," deficiencies are measured not 
against the goals, but against full utilization of minorities and women. See notes 6-7 supra. 
60. See, e.g., CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 28 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 32,402 (D.D.C. 
1981); Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 501 F. Supp. 375, 381 (E.D. Va. 1980), vacated and remanded 
sub nom General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981). Competitive disadvan-
tage arguments are typically made in reverse-FOIA suits, where protective orders are unavaila-
ble, see notes 157-58 infra and accompanying text, but discovecy has also been limited to factual 
information to avoid "adverse impact" on the employer's business operations. National Org. for 
Women v. Spercy Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272, 279 (D. Conn. 1980). 
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of deficiencies in the plan may subject the employer to further suits. A 
final fairness argument is that release of a plan is unnecessary if the 
information needed by the plaintiff is available from other sources. 61 
Such concerns for fairness can be satisfied without completely de-
nying discovery of affirmative action plans. Courts have broad discre-
tion to limit discovery to "relevant" material. 62 They can also control 
the use of discovered materials by conditioning release with a protec-
tive order.63 
3. Comparison to Other Applications of a Self-critical Analysis 
Privilege 
Employers originally invoked the self-critical analysis privilege in 
employment discrimination suits on the theory that the interests pro-
tected are analogous to those protected by the privilege in other con-
texts. 64 The soundness of the privilege is disputed in all of its 
applications, 65 but even if the privilege were regarded as legitimate in 
other areas, its use in employment discrimination suits would repre-
sent an unwarranted expansion into a fundamentally different context. 
One difference is that documents most often entitled to the privilege, 
such as medical malpractice and police investigatory reports, typically 
focus on a single event, while affirmative action programs are part of a 
continuous process with yearly updates mandated by a federal 
agency.66 As such, affirmative action programs are more routine and 
institutionalized and do not depend on the protections and incentives 
arguably necessary to encourage more ad hoc self-investigations. 
The purposes and uses of affirmative action plans also differ from 
those of investigatory reports. The latter typically serve internal pur-
poses and are destined solely for internal use. In contrast, affirmative 
action plans are prepared to comply with federal regulations and with 
the knowledge that they must be submitted to OFCCP on request.67 
61. However, only factual data, not employer self-criticism, is likely to be duplicated else-
where. Even in cases where the court has noted that the factual information was available else-
where, e.g., Stevenson v. General Elec. Co., No. 80-3644, slip op. (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 1982) 
(available on LEXIS, Labor library, Courts file); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 20 Fair Empt. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 526, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 11 Empt. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) ~ 10,659 (W.D. Pa. 1975), these alternative sources of raw data may be irrelevant if the 
plaintiff cannot afford to perform the statistical analyses himself. See notes 105-06 infra and 
accompanying text. 
62. See notes 90, 92, 93-95 infra and accompanying text. 
63. See notes 138-58 infra and accompanying text. 
64. See Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4 FairEmpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 117, 118 (N.D. Ga. 
1971); see also Rosario v. N.Y. Times, 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
65. See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text. 
66. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.14 (1984). 
67. This purpose was stressed in Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 
1979), where the employer asserted a self-critical analysis privilege against FOIA disclosure of its 
plans. The court found the employer had notice of their purpose and denied the privilege. 
[U]nlike the situation in Bredice, the [affirmative action] reports ••• are not made solely for 
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Once the plans are in OFCCP files, they are available to the EEOC68 
or they may be released in response to a FOIA request. 69 Because the 
plans are prepared for an outside purpose and with clear notice that 
they may not remain solely in the employer's control, there is less rea-
son to protect confidentiality than in the case of purely internal 
proceedings. 
Another important distinction is that self-criticism is required by 
government regulation and sanctions are available to enforce the re-
quirements. 70 In contrast, no such measures are brought to bear on 
the other, more "voluntary" reports protected by the privilege. 
'oFCCP regulations and sanctions provide an incentive for self-criti-
cism in affirmative action plans that lessens the need for confidentiality 
to encourage effective evaluation and weakens the argument for ex-
tending the privilege to this context. 
A final reason for distinguishing the application of the privilege to 
affirmative action plans from its application in the paradigm cases is 
that determining exactly what is "self-evaluative" is less straightfor-
ward here than in other contexts. An entire medical committee report 
is "self-evaluative," but an affirmative action plan is a blend of statis-
tics and prose, often with no clear lines between self-evaluation and 
fact.71 For example, much of a plan may be numerical, but this does 
not ensure that the content is purely factual. Certainly a plan's com-
parison of utilization and availability of employees, while it may be 
presented in numerical terms,72 forms the basis of "self-evaluation." 
Courts that have recognized a self-critical analysis privilege have 
dealt with this ambiguity between fact and self-evaluation in various 
ways. Some courts have allowed the employer to remove the self-criti-
cism without court inspection.73 This is an unsatisfactory solution be-
internal use ..•. [Affirmative action plans] and other documents are submitted to the 
OFCCP with the express understanding that they will be used in the administration of Exec-
utive Order 11246 and the Civil Rights Act. 
609 F.2d at 907; see also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978). Since private plaintiffs play a "private attorney general" role in 
enforcing Title VII, see notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text, they should arguably fall under 
the same umbrella of notice. 
68. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979). 
69. See note 10 supra. 
70. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. The sanctions available were emphasized in a 
FOIA suit that rejected the argument that plans need to be protected from disclosure as a matter 
of public policy. The court noted that the employer was subject to a statutory duty to file the 
information and stated that failure to file "would be an act of bad faith and expose the contractor 
to penalties." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1974), va-
cated and remanded, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1422 (9th Cir. 1979). 
71. See notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text. 
72. See note 6 supra. 
73. E.g., Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, No. 83 Civ. 3716 (WCC), slip op. 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Penk v. Oregon State 
Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 506, 507 (D. Or. 1982); Roberts v. National Detroit Corp., 87 
F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
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cause of the potential for employer abuse, as illustrated by an 
employer's claim that pure statistics on numbers of applicants consti-
tute self-criticism. 74 Given the lack of cooperation between adversa-
ries in many proceedings, other courts have concluded that the 
exercise of the privilege requires monitoring. These courts have ex-
amined the plans in camera and have removed damaging material 
themselves. 75 This procedure is often a substantial drain on court re-
sources 76 and some courts have refused to recognize the privilege 
based in part on concerns about the burden of separating fact from 
self-criticism and the efficient use of court time. 77 Despite an oft 
quoted conclusion by one court that "only subjective, evaluative 
materials have been protected; objective data contained in those same 
reports in no case have been protected,"78 some courts have extended 
the privilege to cover the entire plan. 79 This approach eliminates the 
need to distinguish fact and self-criticism, but goes beyond the scope 
of the privilege to restrict discovery of materials not a part of the self-
criticism. It also places an unjustified burden on the plaintiff where 
factual information in the plan is unavailable from other sources. so 
B. Interests That Weigh in.Favor of Permitting the Discovery of 
Affirmative Action Plans 
1. The Mandates of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
The public has a strong interest in achieving Title VIl's goal of 
eliminating employment discrimination.81 A private plaintifrs interest 
in remedying a specific violation overlaps with this public interest be-
74. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 468 (M.D. Ala. 
1980). 
7S. Kg., O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980); Rosario v. New 
York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
76. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, SOI F. Supp. 37S (E.D. Va. 1980), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981) (FOIA 
disclosure of workplace data; in camera inspection of more than 3,300 pages to remove material 
which would damage competitive position). 
77. Kg., Zaborik v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); EEOC v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc., No. 78c-269, slip. op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Labor 
library, Courts file). 
78. Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
79. See note 32 supra. 
80. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
81. Under Title VII, 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect bis status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). 
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cause the private right of action is an extremely important part of Title 
VII enforcement. Although the EEOC was granted direct enforce-
ment power in 1972, Congress retained the private right of action, pri-
marily to ensure individuals an opportunity to press their cases. 82 
However, the Supreme Court has recognized a broader, public role for 
private suits, noting that "the private right of action remains an essen-
tial means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII . . . . In 
such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own injury but 
vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory 
employment practices."83 The Court has stated that the private plain-
, tiff should be considered a "private attorney general" whose role in 
enforcing the Title VII ban on discrimination is parallel to that of the 
EEOC. 84 Private suits have greatly increased the number of legal ac-
tions brought and have thus stimulated the rapid development of Title 
VII. 85 Indeed, although the EEOC often played a critical role in sup-
plying money or expertise, almost all the major Title VII cases that 
shaped and advanced the law have been brought by individuals, not by 
the government. 86 
Liberal discovery is one means of encouraging private suits. While 
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is broad in 
scope87 and has been liberally interpreted, 88 the rules have been ap-
plied even more broadly in Title VII suits. 89 If the material sought is 
82. The retention of the private right of action . • . is intended to make clear that an 
individual aggrieved by a violation of Title VII should not be forced to abandon the claim 
merely because of a decision by the Commission or the Attorney General as the case may 
be, that there are insufficient grounds for the Government to file a complaint. . . • 
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the 
rule. . • • However, as the individual's rights to redress are paramount under the provi-
sions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief. 
118 Cong. Rec. 7565 (1972) (statement of Rep. Perkins). 
83. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (citation omitted). 
84. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); cf. Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (private attorney general concept in Title II suit). 
85. See CoNSULTATIONS, supra note 47, at 72 (statement of Eleanor Holmes-Norton). 
86. See id. at 73; Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Pn'vate Enforcement of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 V AND. L. REv. 905, 924-52 (1978). 
87. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) provides: 
(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court 
in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) In General. Parties 
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tan-
gible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at 
the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
88. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 
104, 114-15 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
89. See, e.g., Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973); Milner v. 
National School of Health Tech., 73 F.R.D. 628, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Courts frequently impose 
limits that restrict discovery with reference to the effective date of Title VII. See, e.g., Georgia 
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not privileged, discovery can be denied when the material is not rele-
vant to the suit90 or when production of the information would be 
burdensome.91 However, courts have wide discretion over the bound-
aries of relevance and burden. They have exercised this discretion to 
permit discovery in Title VII suits both when the material sought did 
not pertain directly to the plaintiff's claim, but might indicate broader 
discrimination,92 and when discovery required the employer to expend 
large amounts of time or money.93 Courts have frequently permitted 
classwide discovery before the determination of class certification94 or 
Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 3 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 8006 (N.D. Miss. 1970). Discovery has also been limited to five years before 
the alleged violation. E.g., Cormier v. PPG Indus., 452 F. Supp. 594, 596 (W.D. La. 1978), 
dismissed, 519 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. La. 1981); Evans v. Local 2127, IBEW, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 
1360 (N.D. Ga. 1969). 
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Southern Ry, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 714 (N.D. Ga. 1977) 
(plaintiff limited to discovery concerning blacks); Ylla v. Delta Air Lines, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 754 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (race information not discoverable when discrimination claim 
was based on national origin); King v. Georgia Power Co. 50 F.R.D. 134, 138 (N.D. Ga. 1970) 
(interrogatory asking for race and seniority of all bidders for all vacancies limited to vacancies for 
which members of the affected class had bid); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 
194 (E.D. La. 1968) (denying oral dispositions for information held irrelevant). 
91. See, e.g., Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978) (interroga-
tories covering 7,500 employees in 32 districts burdensome); Kolta v. Tuck Indus., 20 FED. R. 
SERV. 2D (CALLAGHAN) 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (interrogatories requiring nearly 250 responses 
burdensome); Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586, 591 (D. Md. 1974) 
(70 interrogatories, each with 2 to 23 subparts, overbroad); Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 1 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839, 843 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (information on some 3,000 applicant refer-
rals burdensome); Evans v. Local 2127, IBEW, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (inter-
rogatories unduly burdensome). 
92. See, e.g., Queen v. Dresser Indus., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 757, 759 (D. Md. 
1977) (information on nonbargaining unit employees discoverable); National Org. for Women v. 
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 73 F.R.D. 467, 472 (D. Minn. 1977) (discovery company-wide 
for all employees rather than limited to female hourly employees at two plants); Blank v. Sullivan 
& Cromwell, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (plaintiff entitled to infor-
mation on policies for advancing law firm associates to partnership in case alleging sex discrimi-
nation in associate hiring, even though factors involved in partnership decision differ); Marshall 
v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 68 F.R.D. 287, 295-96 (D. Del. 1975) (defendant required to 
respond to discovery question on why operations were transferred). 
93. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27, 35-36 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (burden im-
posed by defendant's disjointed record-keeping system did not prevent discovery); McLendon v. 
M. David Lowe Personnel Servs., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 250, 253 (S.D. Tex. 1977) 
(interrogatory seeking a list by race and/or national origin of all persons who applied unsuccess-
fully for a certain position during a four-year period that would take 1,250 to 2,500 hours to 
compile); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1287, 1290 (S.D. Tex. 
1975) (defendant must compile response to interrogatory rather than make files available when 
the burden is substantially less than that which would be imposed on plaintiff); Logan v. General 
Fireproofing Co., 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1110,155 (W.D.N.C. 1970). 
94. See, e.g., Huffv. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane) ("The court 
..• often ••. permit[s] discovery relating to the issues involved in maintainability."); Zahorik 
v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Johnson v. Southern Ry., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) 119076 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Lim v. Citizens Sav. & Loan Assn., 430 F. Supp. 802, 809 (N.D. 
Cal. 1976). But see National Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn. 
1980); Cutner v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
See generally 1A c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 21, at § 1785; FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION § 1.40 (1980). 
November 1984] Note - Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans 421 
have allowed inquiry which might tend to establish a pattern of dis-
crimination, even in individual cases.9s 
Courts have granted this particularly broad discovery as a means 
of enhancing the effectiveness of private suits. The private attorney 
general role of the plaintiff increases the importance of disclosure96 
and has been cited to justify permitting discovery with a breadth com-
parable to that of an EEOC investigation.97 Broad discovery also 
serves the individual interests of a private plaintiff. An employee is at 
a disadvantage in documenting employment discrimination and plain-
tiffs often have difficulty in carrying their burden of proof in Title VII 
cases.98 Permitting broad discovery represents an attempt to aid 
plaintiffs by improving their access to adequate documentation. More-
over, a victim of employment discrimination will often have financial 
difficulty bringing a claim99 and courts have recognized the need for 
broad discovery when the financial capabilities of a Title VII plaintiff 
are limited compared to those of a defendant.100 Finally, the prospect 
that substantial information may be obtained through discovery may 
assist a plaintiff h1 obtaining counsel on a contingent-fee basis. 101 
95. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1980); Rich v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 344 (10th Cir. 1975); Mazzella v. RCA Global Co=unications, No. 83 
Civ. 3716 (WCC), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist 
file); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 8969 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Johnson v. 
W.H. Stewart Co., 75 F.R.D. 541, 543 (W.D. Okla. 1976). 
96. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
97. Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973) ("Any information 
relevant - in a discovery sense - to an EEOC investigation is likewise relevant to the private 
attorney-general, either in his individual role or in his capacity as the claimed representative of a 
class."); see also EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1981) (private 
attorney general role cited in holding that charging party may view EEOC investigatory file on 
his case). 
Some co=entators have expressed concern that disclosures to private plaintiffs may impede 
EEOC conciliation and negotiation. See, Co=ent, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private 
Employers, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 4'77, 479-80 (1979). Because the employer may be motivated to 
negotiate in order to avoid litigation, its incentive to settle may decrease if it continues to face 
private suits. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 4~1 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) ("We recognize •.. 
that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation, that lack of success in the 
legal action could weaken the Co=ission's efforts to induce voluntary compliance • . . ."). 
However, the practical effect disclosing affirmative action plans has on conciliation is not clear. 
Katz, Investigation and Conciliation of Employment Discrimination Charges Under Title VII: 
Employers' Rights in an Adversary Process, 28 HAsrlNGs L.J. 877 (1977). The Supreme Court 
has recently rejected this concern and endorsed disclosure of EEOC investigative materials to 
private plaintiffs. The Court suggested that disclosure could improve the Co=ission's ability to 
solve disputes informally. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. at 601 ("A party is far more 
likely to settle when he has enough information to be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of his opponent's case as well as his own.") (citation omitted). 
98. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 527 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 870 (1976). 
99. See Co=ent, supra note 97, at 487. 
100. See, e.g., McLendon v. M. David Lowe Personnel Servs., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 250, 253 (S.D. Tex. 1977); King v. Georgia Power Co., 50 F.R.D. 134, 136 (N.D. Ga. 
1970). 
101. See Co=ent, supra note 97, at 487. 
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2. Usefulness of Affirmative Action Plans as Evidentiary Tools 
Permitting broad discovery in general, and discovery of affirmative 
action plans in particular, is one way to encourage effective private 
suits. The plans provide both statistical and nonstatistical information 
which can aid a plaintiff in meeting the burden of proof in Title VII 
cases. 
Statistics are crucial in cases brought under the adverse impact 
theory of discrimination, where the plaintiff must establish a prima 
facie case that the employer's practices have a substantially dispropor-
tionate discriminatory effect on a protected class. 102 While statistics 
are not as important in individual disparate treatment cases, 103 plain-
tiffs often rely on statistics for proof in class actions.104 
The costs of bringing suit have increased because the courts have 
substantially refined the quality of statistical proof needed to establish 
a Title VII case.105 However, these costs may be reduced by permit-
ting discovery of affirmative action plans which provide extensive doc-
umentation and comparison of the employer's work force and the 
available labor force. 106 While this data will probably be presented in 
a light most favorable to the employer and most plaintiffs would prefer 
to calculate their own statistics from original sources such as person-
nel records, 107 the plans can be useful to a plaintiff with limited finan-
102. The inquiry in disparate impact cases focuses on whether a selection device (such as a 
test) or other criterion for employment or promotion disqualifies a disproportionate number of 
members of the protected class. If the employee can show such impact, he or she has established 
a prima facie case and the employer must demonstrate that the test is job-related or otherwise a 
business necessity to escape liability. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 431 U.S. 424 (1971). Proof 
of a discriminatory motive is not required. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432. Plain-
tiffs commonly introduce pass/fail comparisons for a test or population/work force comparisons 
for other criteria to establish a prima facie case. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
103. "Disparate treatment" •.• is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The 
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in 
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (citations omit-
ted). See generally B. ScHLEl & P .. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 13-22. The Supreme Court has 
established a tripartite procedure for analyzing disparate treatment cases: (1) the plaintiff' must 
establish a prima facie case, (2) the defendant must offer a nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
tions, and (3) the plaintiff must establish that this supposedly legitimate reason was a pretext to 
mask an illegal motive. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973). The 
case most often hinges on the plaintifi's ability to show that the reason for the different treatment 
offered by the employer was a pretext. Comparative evidence showing that persons in a different 
protected group were treated more favorably in a comparable factual situation is normally dis-
positive. See B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1317-20. 
104. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-38 (1977). 
105. See CoNSULTATIONS, supra note 47, at 73 (statement of Eleanor Holmes-Norton). 
Even the smallest class action will cost a minimum of $15,000 for statistical work alone. Id. 
106. See note 5 supra. 
107. Statistics contained in affirmative action plans are broken down by job groups, which 
may mask disparities that would appear in an analysis of individual jobs. For example, if a job 
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cial resources who would be unable to perform a sophisticated 
statistical analysis. 
Although statistical evidence dominates adverse impact cases and 
class disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs often introduce nonstatistical 
evidence in support of the statistical claim. Such evidence is particu-
larly important to the plaintiff when the employer has used statistics to 
reach a conflicting conclusion or when the statistical sample or dispar-
ities between groups are small, thus weakening the force of the statisti-
cal conclusions.108 Part of the value of self-criticism is that any 
conclusions that do support a plaintiff's case carry the authority of the 
employer.109 Such conclusions may also be useful to impeach the em-
ployer's witnesses. 
In addition to the information contained in a plan, the quality of 
affirmative action efforts and the effectiveness of the plan itself are im-
portant forms of nonstatistical proof. Such proof is important in estab-
lishing110 or rebutting111 a prima facie case of employment 
which is largely filled by minorities is combined in a job group with a job dominated by white 
males, the disproportionate representation will balance out for the job group as a whole. 
108. See, e.g., Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1135 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1981) (where 
statistics are significant, but not of a magnitude that "clearly demonstrates intentional discrimi-
nation,'' nonstatistical evidence may be used to support prima facie case in disparate treatment 
class action), cert. denied, 454 U.S 969 (1981). 
109. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 558-59. 
110. See, e.g., Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1135 n.14 (8th Cir. 1981) (evidence 
that defendant failed to live up to its affirmative action program and failed to support its affirma-
tive action director used to support plaintifi's disparate treatment case), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
969 (1981); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 179 (1st Cir.) 
(ineffectiveness of defendant's affirmative action efforts relevant to discriminatory intent in indi-
vidual disparate treatment case), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Greenspan v. 
Automobile Club, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (evidence of employer's ambiva-
lent attitude toward affirmative action program and inadequacy of plan for sex discrimination 
used to support inference of discrimination); cf. Association Against Discrimination in Employ-
ment v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101, 106-07 (D. Conn. 1979) (defendant's refusal to 
recruit minorities coupled with strong statistical evidence of discrimination), affd. in relevant 
part, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 _D.S. 988 (1982). 
111. See, e.g., Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 751 (2d Cir. 1984) (comprehensive affirmative 
action plan evidence of "intent to eliminate gender as an employment criteria"; "antithesis of 
pattern and practice of discrimination"); EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 570 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (aggressive recruiting of minorities and effective affirmative action programs sup-
ported employer's defense); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 427, 445-46 (S.D. Tex. 
1980) (evidence of defendant's aggressive affirmative action program and programs to train su-
pervisors regarding equal employment obligations offered as evidence by defendant), affd., 668 
F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 467 F. Supp. 587, 597-98 (D. Colo. 
1979) (evidence of affirmative action efforts part of employer's defense); cf. Bilingual Bicultural 
Coalition of Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 492 F.2d 656, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FCC license renewal 
case finding that "a disparity that is reasonable in light of a recruitment policy might not be 
reasonable in its absence"); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (statistical 
evidence of disparities insufficient to establish prima facie case against license renewal in light of 
defendant's aggressive affirmative action policies). 
Courts have also viewed evidence of affirmative recruitment and promotion policies as indi-
cating a lack of intent to discriminate under the greater intent requirements of a§ 1981 disparate 
impact case. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vanguard Justice Socy., Inc. v. 
Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1979); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 
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discrimination. Moreover, the plan itself is especially crucial non-
statistical evidence in a reverse discrimination suit. Since the Supreme 
Court upheld a voluntary affirmative action plan against a claim of 
reverse discrimination in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 112 
much of the subsequent litigation has focused on the content of the 
employer's plan.113 
Thus, both the statistical and nonstatistical portions of a plan may 
be helpful in establishing a plaintiff's case, either by demonstrating a 
prima facie case of discrimination or by showing that the employer's 
"legitimate" reason for using a procedure with disparate impact is 
merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. In addition, permit-
ting discovery of the plan may be necessary to a plaintiff's preparation 
for trial if it will form a part of the employer's defense. 
The nature and strength of the conflicting interests of Title VII 
plaintiffs and defendants are important considerations in determining 
whether or not to permit discovery of affirmative action plans. Plain-
tiffs in a Title VII suit share the need of all litigants for sufficient infor-
mation to ensure a full, fair consideration of the issues. These 
concerns are especially strong in the Title VII context, where the em-
ployer can draw on vastly superior resources and data. 114 Employers, 
on the other hand, have legitimate concerns in protecting information 
in the plans from competitors.115 The public has interests in encourag-
ing both affirmative action and enforcement of Title VII. These com-
peting interests all deserve consideration; the pattern of discovery 
selected must reflect not only the importance of those interests, but 
also the full range of methods available to accommodate them. 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE DISCOVERY OF 
.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS 
Courts can take several approaches to the discovery of affirmative 
action plans. Recognition of an absolute privilege116 would provide 
1304 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Worthy v. United States Steel 
Corp., 616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1980). 
112. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
113. See, e.g., Hunter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff 
claiming plan violates Title VII by preferring minorities over women); Lehman v. Yellow Freight 
Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirmative action efforts must include safeguards to 
insure fair treatment of all); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
889 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (requiring evidence that plan meets Weber standards); Jurgens v. Thomns, 
30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 33,090 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (same); McLaughlin v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co., 495 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (same). But see Jamison v. Storer 
Broadcasting Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1295 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (limiting admissibility of affirma-
tive action material so that defendant will not have to "defend, collaterally, the bonafides of the 
affirmative action plan" in addition to defending discrete discriminatory action alleged by plain-
tiff; citing "high potential for misleading and confusing the fact finder''). 
114. See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text. 
115. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. 
116. An "absolute" or "fixed" evidentiary privilege is one that, once recognized, is inviolate 
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the most secure protection from discovery but would balance the com-
peting interests entirely in favor of confidentiality and the employer. 
At the other end of the spectrum, plans could be uniformly released 
without any protections, thus achieving the same results as when the 
plans are obtained through FOIA. This would balance the interests 
entirely in favor of the private plaintiff's interest in enforcing Title VII. 
Plans could also be protected with a qualified privilege,117 which 
would require a balancing of the relevant interests in each individual 
case.11s This Note argues that courts can best accommodate the con-
flicting interests implicated in discovery of affirmative action plans by 
permitting the discovery of such plans under a protective order. 
A. An Absolute Self-critical Analysis Privilege for Affirmative Action 
Plans 
Despite a general judicial trend toward restricting privileges, 119 
except when waived. Examples include the attorney-client, physician-patient, marital and priest-
penitent privileges. The traditional justification for such privileges, which unlike the majority of 
evidentiary rules do not aid in the search for truth by safeguarding the quality of evidence, is that 
public policy requires the safeguarding of co=unications necessary to certain relationships. See 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 72, at 171 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). "[T]he achievement of [these] 
utilitarian objectives requires privileges which are essentially absolute in character." Id. § 77, at 
186. 
117. A "qualified," "limited" or "conditional" privilege may be overcome by public interests 
that require disclosure or by a showing of sufficient hardship on the part of the party seeking to 
introduce the evidence. The most co=only accepted qualified privileges are used to protect 
grand jury transcripts, trade secrets and executive or official government information. See Case 
Comment, Civil Procedure: Self-Evaluative Reports - A Qualified Privilege in Discovery?, 51 
MINN. L. REv. 807, 812 & n.20 (1973). A privilege for informers has also been described as a 
limited privilege. See M. LARKIN, FEDERAL TEsTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 7.05, at 7-14 (1982). 
118. See notes 131-36 infra and accompanying text. See generally Note, supra note 10. 
119. Federal courts have narrowly interpreted existing evidentiary privileges and have been 
hostile to the development of new ones. See, e.g., Tra=el v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) 
(limiting the marital communications privilege); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (refusing 
to recognize an editorial privilege); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 
F.R.D. 388, 389 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (federal court may not create a new federal evidentiary 
privilege unless the privilege "rises to the constitutional level"). The Supreme Court has recently 
warned against the expansion of privilege, reasserting that "these exceptions to the demand for 
every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively constructed, for they are in deroga-
tion of the search for truth." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (footnote omit-
ted). 
However, in adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, Congress rejected a narrow 
enumerated list of privileges and adopted a more flexible rule. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1111501-509 (1982). It thus indicated its "affirmative intention not 
to freeze the Jaw of privilege. Its purpose rather was to 'provide the courts with the flexibility to 
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis •... ' "Tra=el v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 
47 (1980) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 40891) (statement of Rep. Hungate)); see also S. REP. No. 
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7051, 7059 
("[O]ur action should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege 
based on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis."). Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act 
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, 1be 
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the 
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some commentators have urged the recognition of an absolute privi-
lege to protect self-critical analysis from discovery. Those commenta-
tors reason that an absolute privilege is the only way to protect 
confidentiality. 120 This solution is inappropriate because it does not 
recognize countervailing public interests in permitting discovery and 
at the same time would fail to provide the complete confidentiality 
that employers seek. 
An absolute privilege would place undue weight on society's inter-
est in encouraging affirmative action plans and in meeting the goals of 
Executive Order 11,246, to the detriment of the public interest in the 
private enforcement of Title VII. Such a one-sided balancing of the 
public interest is inappropriate in the face of the strong federal policies 
served by such suits: 
[F]ederal equal opportunity laws manifest a strong policy in favor of 
eradicating all vestiges of employment discrimination . . . . In further-
ance of this policy, plaintiffs must be permitted to obtain information 
sufficient to enable them to prove employment discrimination where 
such discrimination exists. To the extent that the defense of "self-critical 
analysis" conflicts with a plaintiff's ability to gather information neces-
sary to prove his or her case, the recognition of such a defense hampers 
the enforcement of federal equal employment laws. 121 
To a certain extent, the goal of Title VII and the Executive Order 
is the same: to eradicate discrimination. However, not only are the 
means chosen to achieve that goal different under the two pro-
grams, 122 but Title VII goes beyond the Executive Order to offer 
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceed· 
ings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule 
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision 
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. 
Emphasis added. This rule leaves the door open for the development of new privileges, such as a 
self-critical analysis privilege, although the fact that such a privilege was not included in the 
proposed rules weighs against its recognition. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 
366-68 (1980) (refusing to recognize a privilege for legislative acts by state legislator charged 
under a criminal statute; relying in part on lack of recognition in proposed rules and lack of 
mention by Congress during debates); United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 858 (E.D.N.Y. 
1975) (specific rules reflective of "reason and experience," were, for the most part, a restatement 
of the federal law of privilege). 
Some of the applications of a self-critical analysis privilege, such as protection of hospital 
committee reports, may be controlled by state legislation. See note 22 supra. However, state law 
is inapplicable to Title VII suits, so a privilege for affirmative action plans can only be developed 
by the federal courts. 
120. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 26, at 496; Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 
HARV. L. R.E.v. 1083, 1097-98 (1983); see also notes 135-36 infra and accompanying text. 
121. Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
122. The Executive Order combats discrimination by using the federal government's bargain· 
ing power to require employers who wish to contract with the government to develop affirmative 
action plans. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text. Lucrative government contracts may 
be thought of as an incentive to develop affirmative action plans. Title VII, on the other hand, 
adopts a more coercive approach to eradicating discrimination. It prohibits employment dis-
crimination and backs up its prohibition with an enforcement mechanism. See note 14 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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strong protection to the individual injured by discrimination.123 The 
rights of individuals cannot be vindicated by an affirmative action pro-
gram alone, and private Title VII suits have proved to be a necessary 
technique for protecting those rights.124 An absolute privilege would 
be one-sided not only in terms of the enforcement of Title VII, but also 
in terms of the "clash between highly-valued interests"12s of the em-
ployer and employee. An absolute privilege hampers the employee's 
ability to establish a case of employment discrimination. As noted by 
one court, "[c]arried to its logical extreme, such a privilege would 
foreclose any discovery of material which might be most strongly pro-
bative of discriminatory intent."126 
Even if it were legitimate to emphasize the Executive Order at the 
expense of Title VII and the employers' interests at the expense of the 
employees', the argument for an absolute privilege overlooks existing 
alternative means of obtaining access to affirmative action plans. Em-
ployers often attempt to justify an absolute privilege by claiming a 
need to be certain that their plans will remain confidential. However, 
people who file requests may obtain plans through the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) and plaintiffs have access to them if they are 
contained in EEOC files. 127 It may even be shortsighted for employers 
to advocate eliminating discovery of the plans since plaintiffs might 
then rely more heavily on these alternative approaches, which lack the 
safeguards that can be afforded to employers in discovery.128 
The proposed privilege is also fundamentally different from the 
privileges traditionally recognized as "absolute," which function to 
protect and enhance a relationship.129 A privilege for self-critical 
123. E.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982) ("Section 703(a)(2) prohibits 
practices that would deprive or tend to deprive 'any individual of employment opportunities.' 
The principle focus of the statute is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the 
protection of the minority group as a whole.") (emphasis by the Court); Los Angeles v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702 (1978) (striking down a retirement program where premiums were set using sex-
based life expectancy tables, citing Title VIl's protection of the individual). 
124. In 1977, the EEOC had a backlog of 130,000 cases and a reputation as the "govern-
ment's worst bureaucratic mess." The backlog was cut in half and efficiency increased by 65% in 
the following two years. E. NORTON, A CoNVERSATION WITH CoMMISSIONER ELEANOR 
HOLMES NORTON 1-2 (1980). In spite of such improvements, the EEOC does not have the 
resources to pursue legal action in many cases where conciliation is unsuccessful. See EEOC, 
GENERAL CoUNSEL MANuAL, reprinted in E.E.O.C. CoMPL. MAN. (CCH) ~ 10,024 (June 
1980). 
125. O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980). 
126. Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
127. See note 10 supra. 
128. See note 157 infra and accompanying text. 
129. Wigmore's definition of the four elements necessary to establish a privilege emphasizes 
the need for a personal relationship between the parties: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance 
of the relation between the parties. -
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the co=unity ought to be sedulously 
fostered. 
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analysis would not enhance the same types of personal interactions 
protected by attorney-client, doctor-patient or husband-wife privi-
leges.130 Qualified privileges also further the policy of ke_eping certain 
information private, but for reasons that must be measured against 
and may have to yield to other policies in an individual case. The 
force of the policies behind encouraging enforcement of Title VII 
through private suits suggests that a privilege for affirmative action 
plans, if approved at all, should provide qualified rather than absolute 
protection for affirmative action plans. 
B. A Balancing Approach to Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans 
Many courts have attempted to balance the interests of Title VII 
plaintiffs and defendants in determining whether to permit discovery 
of affirmative action plans.131 This procedure, essentially that of quali-
fied privilege, has several disadvantages. Most courts undertaking bal-
ancing have inspected the affirmative action plans in camera, 132 which 
can be a very time-consuming process133 and is a questionable use of 
precious judicial resources. In addition, in nonjury cases, the court's 
inspection in camera may later be an impediment to fair and impartial 
factfinding by that same judge.134 
Even more importantly, a policy which leaves the application of 
the privilege to be determined on a case-by-case basis works against 
the very policy advanced as a basis for the privilege. Contractors will 
be as cautious in their self-critical analysis when they cannot be sure of 
its confidentiality in the face of an uncertain privilege as they are when 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications 
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 
8 J. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT CoMMON LAW §'2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 
1961) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original). 
130. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 574. 
131. E.g., EEOC v. Burlington Northern, Inc., No. 78C-269, slip. op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
10, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Labor library, Courts file); O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 
F.R.D. 211, 217-18 (D. Mass. 1980); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 
11 8969 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 
1J ll,095, at 5071 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The balancing approach has also been endorsed by student 
commentators. See Note, supra note 10, at 1013; Note, In re Burlington Northern, Inc.: Self-
Critical Subjective Analysis Privilege under Title VII Discovery, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1090, 
1111 (1983). 
132. E.g., O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980); Brown v. Ford 
Motor Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 118969, at 6028 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Dickerson v. United 
States Steel Corp., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1111,095, at 5071 (E.D. Pa. 1976); cf. Ligon v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 722 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (in camera inspection to 
eliminate material subject to attorney-client privilege). 
133. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 501 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Va. 1980), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981). 
134. See O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980) (not separating 
responsibility for in camera inspection and trial because "contentiousness" of case indicates that 
separation would result in the devotion of "substantial additional judicial time"). The remedial 
power granted courts in § 706(g) of Title VII is "equitable" and jury trials need not be provided 
in Title VII suits. Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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no privilege is available at all. 135 A qualified self-critical analysis privi-
lege requiring case-by-case application has been described as having 
potential "as a tactical device in pnvate litigation . . . but as a plan-
ning tool for corporate decision makers, its uncertainty overshadows 
its utility." 136 Those who advocate the self-critical analysis privilege 
argue that it will be ineffective if confidentiality remains uncertain. 
Therefore, a qualified privilege will not protect employer's interests 
adequately, even though it still places a heavy burden on plaintiffs. 
C. Alternative Means of Protecting Employer's Interests 
If a self-critical analysis privilege is not recognized for affirmative 
action plans, there are other mechp.nisms that can protect the interests 
of society and the employer. OFCCP enforcement mechanisms and 
other incentives such as public pressure for effective affirmative action 
can support Executive Order goals. The employer's privacy interests 
can be protected through the broad control of courts over the rele-
vancy and burdensomeness of discovery. 137 Rule 26(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure facilitates this control by authorizing courts 
to enter a protective order limiting discovery for "good cause."138 
Many of the cases that have granted discovery of affirmative action 
135. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 932, counsel that 
[b ]ecause of the danger that affirmative action plans and supporting documentation may 
be disclosed to third parties either through FOIA requests to the OFCCP or through discov-
ery in litigation, contractors should view their affirmative action plans as documents which 
have potential liability. The plans should be very carefully reviewed to see if they contain 
statements or admissions which can be used against the contractor in employment discrimi-
nation litigation or OFCCP proceedings. 
136. Murphy, supra note 26 at 495; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 
(1981) ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."). 
137. See notes 85-91 supra and accompanying text. However, it should be noted that the 
very fact that a plan is deemed irrelevant to a case (e.g., it deals only with minorities while the 
charge involves sex discrimination) can be evidence of an inadequate attention to certain discrim-
inatory practices. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Automobile Club, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 
1980). 
138. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides: 
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good 
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to 
a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any 
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the 
discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and condi-
tions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by 
a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that cer-
tain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain 
matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by 
the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) 
that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information 
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously 
file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed 
by the court. 
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plans have done so under a protective order for the whole139 or part140 
of the plan. Although Rule 26(c) expressly deals only with protective 
orders affecting depositions141 and trade secrets, 142 protective orders 
covering affirmative action plans are implicitly authorized by the rule, 
which allows a court to order that discovery must proceed on "speci-
fied terms and conditions."143 
Any person "from whom discovery is sought" may file a motion 
for a protective order.144 Orders are flexible and can be fashioned to 
fit the needs of a specific case.145 The movant has the burden of show-
ing "good cause" for a protective order, and Rule 26 requires a balanc-
ing of one party's need for information with the other party's need for 
con:fidentiality.146 
One of the limitations most frequently imposed by protective or-
ders is a restriction on the number and categories of persons who may 
have access to the discovered information.147 For example, access 
may be limited to counsel and to counsel's staff, and then only to the 
extent necessary to assist in preparing the case.148 Such a restriction 
prevents damaging publicity and should deal adequately with an em-
ployer's concerns that the release of a plan might hurt employee mo-
rale or provide competitors with trade secrets.149 Restrictions may 
also be placed on the uses to which the discovering party may put the 
information. One common prohibition is that the receiving party may 
not use the information for commercial purposes.150 When release of 
139. E.g., Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446, 454 (D. Md. 1984); Riggs v. United 
Parcel Serv., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 93 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Ford v. University of Notre 
Dame, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 31,203, at 17,351-52 (N.D. Ind. 1980); Lignon v. Frito-Lay, 
Inc., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 722, 723 (N.D. Tex. 1978); EEOC v. ISC Fin. Corp., 14 
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 7729 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 20 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 526, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 
140. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Sea-Land Serv., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 30,907 (N.D. Cal. 
1980) (salary information protected). 
141. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(c)(6). 
142. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(c)(7). 
143. See Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
1645, 1645 n.2 (1980). 
144. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(c). 
145. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2043, at 305 (1970). 
146. See R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE§ 1.9.1, at 54 (1982). The party 
requesting the order must specifically itemize reasons why the material must be kept confidential. 
Conclusionary statements are not sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323 
(5th Cir. 1978); General Dynamics Corp. v. Seib Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974). 
147. See J. UNDERWOOD, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES 132 (1979). 
148. See, e.g., EEOC v. St. Francis Community Hosp., 70 F.R.D. 592 (D.S.C. 1976); see also 
United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (similar procedure in an 
antitrust case); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 634 
P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981) (business trade secrets). 
149. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. 
150. See, e.g., Chemical & lndu5. Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1962). The 
. 
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commercial information or trade secrets is a concern, 151 the employer 
can invoke Rule 26(c)(7) and a large body of case law outside the Title 
VII context.152 When employers are concerned that the self~criticism 
in a plan may stimulate further law suits, protective orders can pro-
hibit use of discovered materials by litigants in subsequent legal ac-
tions153 or require that the documents be returned immediately after 
their use in the trial of a particular case.154 
Violation of a protective order is grounds for contempt. One com-
mentator has summarized the effectiveness of Rule 26 by stating that 
"the protection afforded by court protective ord[e]rs is not to be un-
derestimated."155 However, it may be difficult for a court to deter-
mine if ostensibly protected information is disclosed in violation of an 
order. 156 Despite the difficulties in policing an order, the protective 
order device represents a logical compromise between the interests of 
employers and employees in the discovery of affirmative action plans. 
A court's control over discovery and over the specific protective order 
provides safeguards not available to an employer faced with a success-
ful FOIA request for the plan. In addition, OFCCP regulations pro-
vide little procedural protection to contractors who may object to the 
plaintiff in a Title VII suit is usually an employee and not a competitor with an interest in trade 
secrets. Nevertheless, problems may arise when plaintiff's counsel also represents another client 
who is a competitor. 
151. E.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 501 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Va. 1980), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981); National 
Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn. 1980). 
152. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c)(7). See generally R. MlLGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS 
§ 7.06 (Business Organizations Vol. 12A 1984); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, 
§ 2043. 
153. E.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1961); Milsen Co. v. 
Southland Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1173,865 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Leshem v. Continental Am. 
Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
154. See P. DAVIS, DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES: A HANDBOOK FOR MICHIGAN LAWYERS 
app. B-99 to -100 (1977). 
155. R. MILGRIM, supra note 152, § 7.06[1], at 7-78. 
156. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In 
addition to the practical difficulties of enforcing protective orders, an aggressive order may face 
constitutional challenge. An order restraining extra-judicial comment by parties and lawyers 
may be attacked as a violation of a first amendment interest in disseminating discovered informa-
tion. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
However, it appears that first amendment concerns about protective orders have been laid to 
rest by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 
(1984). The Court held that a court could, under a state version of Rule 26, prohibit a newspaper 
from publishing information obtained through discovery. Because discovery is a matter oflegis-
lative grace, a litigant has only a slight first amendment interest in publicly releasing information 
obtained for the purpose of trying a case. In contrast, the power to issue protective orders "fur-
thers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expresion." 104 S. Ct. 
at 2208. Therefore, a protective order does not offend the first amendment if it is entered on a 
showing of good cause in the context of civil discovery and it does not restrict dissemination of 
information gained from other sources. 104 S. Ct. at 2209-10. For a critique of the Rhinehart 
decision, see Note, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1813, 1837-44 (1984). 
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release of documents they have submitted. 157 A plaintiff may feel 
hampered by the restrictions imposed by the protective order, how-
ever, alternative means of obtaining access to an affirmative action 
plan may be even less attractive. FOIA disclosure requests are often 
time consuming.158 A plaintiff would probably prefer to obtain the 
plan through discovery, even if it means adhering to the conditions of 
a protective order. Thus, both the employer's interest in confidentiality 
and the employee's and public's interest in facilitating Title VII ac-
tions are accommodated by a doctrine that encourages the litigants to 
submit to court-controlled discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Even with their limitations, protective orders can allay many of the 
fairness arguments against allowing discovery of affirmative action 
plans. A policy of allowing discovery under a protective order cou-
pled with energetic enforcement of the Executive Order would provide 
the best balance between the competing public interests in Title VII 
enforcement and affirmative action as well as the competing interests 
of employer and Title VII plaintiff. The encouragement of private 
suits, as advanced in liberal discovery policies and access to affirmative 
action plans, is particularly important given the current cutbacks in 
governmental support for EEOC enforcement of Title VII and for im-
plementation of the Executive Order. 
157. It is OFCCP policy to disclose affirmative action plans (whether approved or not), final 
conciliation agreements and validation studies of tests used to select employees. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
40.2(b)(l), (3), (4) (1984). Certain records may be withheld if OFCCP determines release would 
not be in the public interest and would impede the discharge of its functions. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
40.3(a)(l), (2), (5), (6). There is no express provision requiring notification of a contractor that 
the documents it submitted have been requested through FOIA, but contractors may obtain an 
agency determination on whether the information they have submitted is subject to FOIA disclo-
sure. 41 C.F.R. § 60-60.4(d). 
158. See note 10 supra. 
